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INTRODUCTION 
 
The North Atlantic is the largest intercontinental aviation market globally, accounting for 3.2 Mio 
passengers each way in the year 2016. While post-9/11 capacity reductions, mergers and joint ventures (1) 
fostered market consolidation, recent years saw the inauguration of new routes, including those by new “long 
haul low cost” ventures (2) like Norwegian or Wow Air. Given these developments, we assume the competitive 
positions (CP) of the airlines operating on the transatlantic to have changed over time and to be generally lower 
(i.e. more exposed to competition) now than in the Noughties. For this, we define a carrier’s competitive 
position as the relative market position it occupies in its whole network (see e.g. (3)). 
 
However, quantifying an airline’s competitive position is not trivial as carriers compete not only at the 
direct route level but serve many different origin-destination (OD) markets with varying degrees of direct or 
indirect competition (4). At the end of the day, networks compete against each other. For example, the relative 
CP of a particular carrier on a route from O to D will not only depend on its own performance on this route in 
relation to other airlines’ direct flights, but also on the indirect supply from O to D via any hubs H.1 
“Traditional” competition assessments at the national, airport- or direct route-levels, usually applying the 
Hirshman-Herfindahl index (HHI) as in (5), (6), (7), or (8), do hence not reflect the whole picture (5). 
 
This paper applies a modelling approach capable of assessing the individual CP of airlines at their whole 
network (OD) level to the transatlantic market. The approach, which was already applied to intra-Europe in an 
earlier paper (9), considers an airline’s actual market share on each single OD and the relative contribution of 
each OD to the airline’s total passenger numbers. The model requires OD traffic flow data as input and provides 
an indicator for the airline’s CP as output.  
 
The results for four selected years between 2002 and 2016 indicate volatile, but generally decreasing CPs 
in the long run, as well as higher CPs (0.35-0.6) for geographically specialized airlines and for dedicated leisure 
carriers. The CPs of the biggest European full service network carriers (FSNC) are “in the same league”(0.25-
0.35) as those of the largest US carriers, indicating a quite balanced distribution of market power.  
 
This network perspective is not new, but most of the earlier work in this field either tackles the role of 
network competition from a pure theoretical or conceptual perspective ((10), (11)) or focused on the US 
domestic market (e.g. (5)). The approach is considered to be of relevance e.g. for policy makers or investors and 
could also be applied e.g. in analyses to be conducted in the context of cartel decisions.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To assess a carrier’s CP, we consider all ODs on which this airline carries passengers. We define the 
overall, network-wide competitive position (CPi) of a carrier i as the sum over all of its OD-specific market 
shares (MSij) in its OD markets j multiplied by the relevance of each ODj, which can be proxied by the number 
of passengers of airline i on ODj (PAXij) divided by the airline’s total passenger number PAXi (equations (1) 
and (2)). 
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If no other airline carried passengers on the same ODs, all market shares MSij as well as the carrier’s 
total CP would amount to 1. The carrier would then be free from any intra-modal competition. If all OD-
relations were dominated by other carriers, its CP would be close to zero. 
 
OD-level Passenger volumes are provided by the Sabre Market Intelligence (MI) database (12) which  
relies on validated raw booking data, supplemented by data from external sources and estimates for direct 
                                               
1 Not considered here are is competition from alternative airports, or from other modes of transport. 
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bookings and charters. The North Atlantic market is defined as demand between the Sabre-regions “Western 
Europe” and “North America”. 
 
Using MS Excel, the analysis is run with available datasets for the years 2002, 2009, 2012 and 2016, to 
reflect different time-points over the last 15 years. To scale the massive amount of data down and to reflect the 
idea that several airports serving one city may be exchangeable, we perform the analysis at the city-to-city-level.  
 
Also, we have chosen the month of September as reference and not the respective full year. This also 
helps reducing the sample size and is unlikely to bias the results as the month of September is usually 
characterized both by solid business and leisure demand and hence supposed to be a good proxy for the annual 
average. Finally, only one-way ODs are considered, as the market shares on the return segments from North 
America to Western Europe are likely to be very similar. 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Table 1 and the subsequent figures report the development of the CP for all 26 airlines that appeared 
among the Top 20 of the largest carriers (in terms of September passenger totals) on the Western Europe-North 
America axis in any of the years 2002, 2009, 2012 or 2016.  
 
TABLE 1: CPs of largest transatlantic airlines, 2002-2016 
IATA 
Code 
Carrier Name Competitive Position 
2002 2009 2012 2016 
AA American Airlines 26% 26% 22% 25% 
AB Air Berlin Not yet active 36% 48% 33% 
AC Air Canada 49% 39% 40% 39% 
AF Air France 25% 28% 34% 23% 
AY Finnair 25% 39% 46% 39% 
AZ Alitalia 41% 34% 34% 28% 
BA British Airways 27% 24% 28% 26% 
CO Continental Airlines  
(now part of United Airlines) 
22% 29%  Exit  Exit 
DE Condor Flugdienst 41% 62% 59% 51% 
DL Delta Airlines 34% 34% 33% 30% 
DY Norwegian Not yet active Not yet active Not yet active 36% 
EI Aer Lingus 55% 29% 46% 37% 
FI Icelandair 38% 46% 46% 34% 
IB Iberia 36% 41% 33% 27% 
KL KLM 26% 27% 27% 22% 
LH Lufthansa 32% 30% 34% 30% 
LX Swiss 31% 27% 36% 31% 
MT Thomas Cook Airlines UK Data missing 57% Data missing 46% 
NW Northwest Airlines 
(now part of Delta Airlines) 
25% 28% Exit  Exit 
OA Olympic Airlines 57% 42% 9%  Exit 
SK SAS  44% 39% 41% 35% 
TP TAP Air Portugal 54% 55% 43% 36% 
TS Air Transat 34% 45% 53% 48% 
UA United Airlines 31% 27% 31% 26% 
US US Airways 
(now part of American Airlines) 
26% 35% 35%  Exit 
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VS Virgin Atlantic 38% 41% 39% 29% 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of the CP of the largest North American and European FSNC. The 
US carriers seem to have lower competitive positions than Air Canada AC. One reasons for this might be that, 
for Canadian destinations, flights with US carriers make no suitable alternative for various reasons (detour, 
passport, baggage through-check and visa issues…). This leaves only selected European carriers as competitors 
for Air Canada, while US carriers have to share the market both between themselves and with Air Canada and 
their European counterparts. The figure also indicates an overall decrease of the competitive position of all 
carriers in the long run, proving the hypothesis from the introduction, as well as an increase of United Airlines’ 
potential market power between 2009 and 2012, which may stem from the merger with Continental Airlines. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: CP of largest North American and European FSNC, 2002-2016 
 
The large European FSNC show similar patterns. First, all of their CPs declined in the long run, again 
indicating increasing competition. Second, the CPs of Lufthansa, Air France and British Airways are “in the 
same league” as those of the US carriers, indicating a quite balanced distribution of market power. Third, more 
specialized carriers like SAS SK and Virgin Atlantic VS tend to have higher CPs, comparable to Air Canada. In 
the case of SAS, this might be related to the geographical location of many European origins in Northern Europe 
which are quite badly connected via the large European hubs. Virgin Atlantic, in contrast, is specialized on 
nonstop routes between London and North America and hardly offers any intra-European feeders. This makes 
the airline less exposed to competition via other hubs. The sharp decline of Virgin’s CP between 2012 and 2016 
might be related to the increase in direct flights between London to the US, now also offered by LCC like 
Norwegian.   
 
Figure 2 shows the CPs of selected “other” carriers: Leisure airlines Condor DE and Air Transat TS 
seem to be much less exposed to competition on the ODs they serve as the network carriers. This may lie in the 
fact that they tend to offer dedicated routes to leisure destinations which are usually not served by other carriers, 
and on which large shares of passengers may prefer the nonstop option for instance for reasons of convenience 
and comfort. Typical Condor destinations in the US are not the large airports and destinations, but Anchorage, 
Seattle, Portland or Austin. Despite of fluctuations, Irish carrier Aer Lingus also used to have a higher CP than 
the large FSNC, which may be caused by the fact that routings from Ireland to the US with European 
competitors would result in relatively large detours. Norwegian DY, with a CP of 36% in 2016, is new in the 
market and known as the first LCC flying transatlantic.   
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FIGURE 2: CP of large “other carriers”, 2002-2016 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Assessing an airline’s overall competitive position is complex as airlines serve many different direct and 
indirect OD markets with varying degrees of competition. Hence, the “typical” HHI-based competition 
assessments will not always reflect the whole picture.  
This extended abstract presents a modelling approach which aims at closing this gap. It allows for an 
assessment of the competitive position of airlines at the network level, considering the actual competitive 
positions on each single OD pair in relation to competing airlines, which are weighted by the relative importance 
of each city-pair in terms of OD passengers in relation to the airline’s total passenger number. 
An application of the indicator to the North Atlantic air transport market indicates sometimes volatile, 
but overall decreasing CPs in the long run. Reasons for this might include a relatively “narrow” market in the 
Noughties followed by overall capacity increases and the inauguration of low cost long haul services in the 
context of low fuel prices and an overall good economic climate in recent years. The results do also indicate 
higher CPs for specialized carriers, like e.g. leisure airlines that focus on direct flights to more “obscure” 
destinations, or airlines like Air Canada or SAS that serve many remote regions, than for the big players that 
offer quite similar multi-hub networks within their alliances. 
Our approach could be a basis for an instrument that may be useful e.g. for policymakers or regulators. 
For example, in forthcoming cartel cases, it could be worth comparing an airline’s present CP with the simulated 
CP after the merger.  
There are a number of limitations to this approach. First, only the competition intensity on the same city 
pairs has been considered, neglecting any competition from similar routes operated from and/or to alternative 
airports beyond the same metropolitan regions, which may e.g. be reached by high-speed trains or car. Also, the 
CP could be calculated based on revenues instead of passengers, which might better reflect the carriers’ financial 
perspectives. More importantly, as many airlines are not financially or strategically independent from each other 
and hence should not be regarded as competitors, the methodology should be performed for an amended dataset 
containing OD flows at the airline group and/or joint venture levels, to account for takeovers and cartels. Lastly, 
the relevance of the indicator could be further assessed in exploring to what extent it has an actual impact on 
airline financial figures. 
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